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This was confirmed by Source D, a close associate of TRUMP who had organized and managed his recent trips to Moscow, and who reported, also in June 2016, that this Russian intelligence had been "very helpful".The Kremlin's cultivation operation on TRUMP also had comprised offering him various lucrative real estate development business deals in Russia, especially in relation to the ongoing 2018 World Cup soccer tournament.Central Bank claims there were over 20 serious attacks on correspondent accounts held by CBR in 2015, comprising Roubles several billion in fraud — Some details given of leading non-state Russian cyber criminal groups Details 1.Speaking in June 2016, a number of Russian figures with a detailed knowledge of national cyber crime, both state-sponsored and otherwise, outlined the current situation in this area.— Example given of US citizen of Russian origin approached by FSB and offered incentive of "investment" in his business when visiting Moscow.— Problems however for Russian authorities themselves in countering local hackers and cyber criminals, operating outside state control.Such people often would receive monetary inducements or contractual favours from the Russian state or its agents in return.
The hotel was known to be under FSB control with microphones and concealed cameras in all the main rooms to record anything they wanted to. The Moscow Ritz Carlton episode involving TRUMP reported above was confirmed by Source E, [redacted], who said that s/he and several of the staff were aware of it at the time and subsequently. Source E provided an introduction for a company ethnic Russian operative to Source F, a female staffer at the hotel when TRUMP had stayed there, who also confirmed the story.External targets include foreign governments and big corporations, especially banks. Limited success in attacking top foreign targets like G7 governments, security services and IFIs but much more on second tier ones through IT back doors, using corporate and other visitors to Russia — FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit most capable cyber operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored programmes.Heavy use also, both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighbouring governments e.g.Latvia — Example cited of successful Russian cyber operation targeting senior Western business visitor.Provided back door into important Western institutions.